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Many risks associated with hedge funds can be addressed through indirect measures aimed at the hedge 
funds’ counterparties and creditors, nearly all of which are regulated banks and securities ﬁ  rms. Hence, 
we consider here how indirect supervision has been made more effective over time and how we should 
be continuing to make it more effective in practice.
The theoretical usefulness of hedge funds in making markets more efﬁ  cient and more stable is undisputed 
but does not always materialize in practice. In order to preserve market efﬁ  ciency and ﬁ  nancial stability, we 
need therefore to increase incentives for an effective and long lasting market discipline. Not to do anything 
is simply not an option given the growth of the hedge fund industry and the fact that hedge funds often act 
no differently from other ﬁ  nancial institutions, whose history has shown worth a look by ﬁ  nancial watchdogs. 
Risk management needs to continuously keep pace with ﬁ  nancial innovation. This is a challenge for the 
indirect supervision of hedge funds but also a support to the pragmatism of this approach.
In order to be able to press banks to put enough emphasis on sound risk management, international cooperation 
is required. Without an international level playing ﬁ  eld, short term competitive pressure between banks would 
indeed most likely derail our efforts. This is a strong and welcome incentive for regulators to be efﬁ  cient. 
In addition, the cooperation between banking and securities supervisors should continue to allow indirect 
supervision to be strengthened and updated as characteristics of the hedge fund business evolve over time.
The ﬁ  rst mitigant against the risks associated, for any single institution, with hedge funds is robust internal 
risk management systems. Hence, speciﬁ  c attention is warranted as regards access by banks to more 
comprehensive information on their Highly Leveraged Institutions (HLI) counterparties, better incorporation 
of counterparties’ transparency and credit quality into collateral policies, effective improvements
of complex products exposures’ measurement (due account being taken of model risks), enhancements to 
stress testing (in particular liquidity stress testing). In addition, indirect supervision needs to be leveraged
by an improvement in hedge funds broad transparency to the market. Stress tests, indeed, should enable 
banks to capture their full exposure to a sufﬁ  ciently broad range of adverse conditions, including not only 
their direct exposure to a particular hedge fund but also their overall exposure to market dislocations
that might be associated with the failure of one or several hedge funds (second round effects).
A second mitigant is an efﬁ  cient oversight, in particular by banking supervisors, of the trading relations that 
hedge funds have with their counterparties. In this respect, the Pillar 2 of Basel II (namely the supervisory 
review process which will deal with all banking risks beyond those covered by Pillar 1 regulatory capital 
charges) will incorporate some of the risks speciﬁ  cally concentrated in hedge fund exposures, i.e. liquidity
risk, concentration risk, tail risk, model risk... It seems also now critical to check that banks’ internal 
information systems are capable of capturing the full range of exposures to hedge funds.
Finally, banks are required by supervisors to hold regulatory capital as a buffer in relation to the risks they 
take. This capital adequacy requirement forms the third line of defence against the risks that a ﬁ  nancial 
institution assumes today when dealing with hedge funds.
Last but not least, micro and macro prudential targets converge when banking supervisors press each 
individual institution for more comprehensive stress tests and the related risk management actions, including 
against second round effects, i.e. against systemic instability.
NB: The author thanks Guy Levy-Rueff and Olivier Prato of the Directorate Policy and Research at the French Banking Commission for their contributions to this article.ARTICLES
Danièle Nouy: “Indirect supervision of hedge funds”
96  Banque de France • Financial Stability Review – Special issue on hedge funds • No. 10 • April 2007
T
he history of indirect supervision of hedge 
funds is already quite long. In the aftermath of 
the near collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term 
Capital Management (LTCM), in September 1998, 
great attention has been paid by the ofﬁ  cial sector 
and industry groups to the risks associated with 
the activities of hedge funds and to the possible 
policy responses. In particular, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued a report
on banks’ interactions with Highly Leveraged 
Institutions (HLI) in January 1999 in conjunction 
with a paper outlining sound practices for 
such interactions.1 With respect to the possible 
policy responses, the report described different 
approaches which included indirect supervisory 
approaches, enhanced transparency and various 
direct approaches. The BCBS, in particular, 
highlighted that many of the risks associated with 
the activities of hedge funds could be addressed 
through indirect measures aimed at the hedge 
funds’ counterparties and creditors, nearly all
of which are regulated banks and securities ﬁ  rms. 
In the same vein, the US President’s Working
Group (PWG) on Financial Markets considered how 
best to constrain excessive leverage by hedge funds. 
The Working Group concluded in its report published 
in April 1999 that hedge funds’ leverage could be 
constrained most effectively by promoting measures 
that enhance market discipline and improve credit 
risk management by hedge funds’ counterparties. It 
described this approach as the “indirect regulation” 
or “indirect supervision” of hedge funds.
Since then, the indirect supervision of hedge funds 
has also been addressed through various public and 
private initiatives by, among others, the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF), the BCBS, the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 
the Multidisciplinary Working Group on Enhanced 
Disclosure (MWGED), and the Counterparty Risk 
Management Policy Group (CRMPG) I and II…
Although a public position was not always taken 
and that direct regulation has also been advocated, it 
seems fair to say that most believed that supervisors 
and regulators could achieve through indirect 
supervision much of what could be achieved by 
direct regulation. This remains relevant today.
The purpose of this article is to consider how 
indirect supervision has been made more effective
over time and how we should be continuing to strive 




Hedge funds can be considered from a variety of 
viewpoints. It can be useful for supervisors to analyze 
the issues raised by the hedge fund industry through 
two principal criteria, i.e. the hedge funds impacts:
• on ﬁ  nancial stability;
• and on ﬁ  nancial integrity.
Financial stability means, in my view, not only the 
resilience of the ﬁ  nancial sector against defaults,
but also the absence of destabilising ﬁ  nancial 
market dynamics, when such dynamics can increase 
ﬁ   nancial sector default probabilities. Financial 
integrity means well-functioning but also fair 
ﬁ  nancial relationships (which is a precondition for 
any structure to function well over a long period 
of time). We should obviously try to, analytically, 
disentangle them, but also take into account that 
they are often inter-related.
These criteria can be applied to the relations
of hedge funds with four types of institutions
or structures:
• banks and other ﬁ  nancial institutions;
• ﬁ  nancial markets;
• investors (institutional and retail);
• and the corporate sector.
I will obviously focus on hedge funds relations 
with banks. We should also take into account that 
there is no single deﬁ  nition of hedge funds even 
if their most important characteristics are well 
known: freedom of investment strategies (including
short-selling, use of derivatives and leverage)
and of contractual relationships with their customers 
(in term of fees or lock-up periods for example). 
These characteristics are linked to the fact that 
they are in general not, or lightly, regulated in a 
direct manner, including as regards their degree 
1  See BCBS (1999): “Banks’ interactions with highly leveraged institutions” and “Sound practices for banks’ interactions with highly leveraged institutions”, January.ARTICLES
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of transparency. But hedge funds’ and many other 
ﬁ   nancial institutions’ activities are becoming 
more similar. Distinctions between private equity 
funds, hedge funds and proprietary trading of large 
investment banks are often blurring and a continuum 
is building between traditional and alternative 
fund management. The consequences of complex 
and/or leveraged risk exposures management are 
then becoming the key point to address whoever is 
initiating such trades.
I guess that most people would agree that, in 
order to preserve market efﬁ  ciency and ﬁ  nancial
stability/ﬁ  nancial integrity, we need to promote 
incentives for an effective and long lasting market 
discipline regarding, among others, hedge funds. 
From a supervisory perspective, two other options 
should be disregarded:
• not do anything;
• and try to regulate directly hedge funds.
Not do anything is simply not an option given the 
growth of the hedge fund industry and the fact 
that hedge funds ﬁ  nancial operations are often not 
different from those of other ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
whose history has shown to be worth a look by 
ﬁ   nancial watchdogs. We should recognise the 
theoretical usefulness of hedge funds in making 
markets more efﬁ  cient, thanks to enhanced price 
discovery mechanisms, inconsistencies arbitrage or 
liquidity enhancement. They can also make markets 
more stable, by bringing a diversity of targets and 
constraints among market participants. But we 
should also recognise that all these theoretical 
advantages do not always materialize. This is for 
example the essence of the academic debate around 
the reality of the “alpha” and the ability of hedge 
funds to provide return which is not (in a strong form 
of the “alpha” argument) or not easily (in a softer 
form of the same argument) correlated to market 
return and risk. In recent years, correlation between 
hedge funds returns has also displayed a tendency to 
increase.2 This is an indication of potential crowded 
trades, i.e. of similar trades done by various actors in 
a single market. Hence the risk of market instability 
when such trades are unwound, in particular if this 
come as a reaction to a shock, e.g. a fundamental 
economic change or the need to liquidate positions 
because of collateral requirements. A lot of those 
market participants which are supposed to bring 
diversity and contrarian strategies might in fact be 
on the same side of the market and under pressure 
to unwind their exposure in a short period of time, 
as was the case in May 2005 when GM and Ford 
were downgraded. True turbulences were relatively
short-lived. But we should note that they were 
serious although the triggering factor, the downgrade 
of GM and Ford, had been widely expected.
This recent episode sounds less a reassuring sign 
than a sound warning that risk management
and market discipline needs to continuously keep 
pace with ﬁ  nancial innovation and search for yield. 
This is, by the way, both a challenge for the indirect 
supervision of hedge funds and a reason to support this 
approach, because of its pragmatism and ﬂ  exibility. 
It attempts to make various tools, mostly used in a 
more general context, converge in order to address 
the most pressing risks which, at certain points
of time begin to crystallize in some areas, e.g. around 
the behaviour and fast moving role of hedge funds 
in the ﬁ  nancial system. I believe that the progress, 
made in recent years in term of indirect supervision, 
have already contributed to make the ﬁ  nancial 
system more resilient, as recently witnessed
by the “smooth failure” of the hedge fund Amaranth. 
But progress need to continue at the same speed as 
ﬁ  nancial innovation.
The formidable challenges in terms of costs and 
effectiveness that arise when one thinks about 
developing a direct regulatory regime for hedge 
funds and the absence of any international 
consensus on that matter are dissuasive. 
Furthermore, a moral hazard issue is likely to 
arise if a direct regulation is imposed without 
appropriate means to enforce it or to draw all 
consequences of it. In particular, market discipline 
might decrease if ﬁ  nancial institutions assume 
that the direct regulation offers them an option, 
a “regulators put”, i.e. a ﬂ  oor to potential losses 
in their relations with hedge funds. They might 
then assume that direct regulation decreases the 
risks, or the cost of the risks, hence that they 
should put more emphasis on short term proﬁ  t 
than on avoiding medium term risks. In fact, 
the freedom to look for proﬁ  t opportunities and 
2  See for example Tomas Gabaravičius and Frank Dierick (2005): “Hedge funds and their implications for ﬁ  nancial stability”, ECB occasional paper, August ;
and the updates in more recent ECB or Banque de France Financial Stability Reviews.ARTICLES
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the obligation to avail of sharp risk management 
should go hand in hand in an efﬁ  cient but stable 
ﬁ  nancial system. This is exactly what the indirect 
supervision approach seeks to foster.
Let me also stress that, in order to be able to 
press banks to put enough emphasis on sound 
risk management, international cooperation is 
required. Without an international level playing 
ﬁ  eld in term of banking regulation and supervision 
practices related to hedge funds exposures, short 
term competitive pressure between banks to grasp 
immediate fees and commissions would indeed 
most likely derail our efforts. This holds particularly 
true in the case of hedge funds which are specialist
of arbitraging market discrepancies but also 
regulatory discrepancies. This is a strong, and let me 
say welcome, incentive for regulators to be efﬁ  cient. 
In today’s global ﬁ  nancial world, this means that 
ﬁ  nancial regulators and supervisors should always 
stay close enough to operational issues, which might 
differ from one market to another, but should also 
coordinate their objectives and actions. 
More speciﬁ  cally, what role should we assign to 
indirect supervision, i.e. the supervision of the 
interactions between hedge funds and regulated 
counterparties such as banks? 
2| ENHANCING RISK
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
The ﬁ  rst line of defence against the risks associated, 
for any single institution, with hedge funds,
as well as the possible domino risks which can 
escalate into systemic risk, is robust internal 
risk management systems within hedge funds 
counterparties, primarily prime brokers, but more 
generally, banks. Indeed, on the one hand, banks 
lending practices impact the leverage that hedge 
funds can put in place and, on the other hand, 
banks are likely to be the main channel of any 
contagion after some hedge funds failure, either, 
directly, through credit risk, or, indirectly, through 
the market impact of their reactions. 
It is the reason why the BCBS 1999 paper focused 
on sound practices regarding Highly Leveraged 
Institutions (HLI) in six areas that related primarily 
to internal controls: clear procedures for involvement 
with HLI (including effective due diligence), sound 
and well-deﬁ  ned credit analysis of potential highly 
leveraged counterparties, meaningful exposure 
measurement, effective limit setting, collateral 
provision and other contractual provisions 
aligned with the credit quality of highly leveraged 
counterparties and, ﬁ  nally, ongoing monitoring 
of HLI creditworthiness and exposures to HLI. 
These areas of risk management are not new but 
combine two characteristics: being both important 
and difﬁ  cult to put in place effectively (“effectively” 
being a key word even if it can be tarnished when 
used too often).
Improvements in risk management and measurement 
practices have been noticed since the LTCM episode: 
better awareness of the private sector as well as 
reinforcing pressure from the ofﬁ  cial sector has 
helped market discipline. However, some concerns 
remain and have recently called for renewed 
attention given the competitive pressures between 
banks, which can decrease market discipline. In 
addition, the increasingly complex relationships 
that banks have developed with the hedge funds 
industry can make market discipline more difﬁ  cult 
to achieve. The recommended sound practices in the 
BCBS 1999 report, many of them being also covered 
in the CRMPG II report,3 remain relevant and their 
implementation, in a changing environment, still 
a standard to achieve. In particular, some general 
elements of the Committee’s characterization 
of banks’ interactions with hedge funds appear 
still important: “The Committee’s review
of banks’ dealings with HLI has revealed that in 
many cases there has not been an appropriate 
balance among the key elements of the credit 
risk management process, with an over reliance 
on collateralisation of mark-to-market exposures. 
Insufﬁ  cient weight was placed on in-depth credit 
analysis of the HLI counterparties involved and 
the effective measurement and management
of exposures”. The analysis by the supervisor
of the relationship between hedge funds and banks 
needs therefore to be comprehensive and detailed, 
3  Toward Greater Financial Stability (2005): “A Private Sector Perspective”, CRMPG II, July.ARTICLES
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going for example far into the technicalities
of the collateralisation process and its potential 
shortcomings.
More speciﬁ   cally, a few areas exist where 
improvements to counterparty risk management 
practices still deserve great supervisory attention. 
Interestingly, many of these areas were already 
identiﬁ  ed in the BCBS 2000 report4 which examined 
the extent to which banks had implemented
the 1999 sound practices paper. This does not mean 
that such recommendations are an empty speech. 
On the contrary, it shows that we face complex 
issues, which are never totally solved, and have to 
be continuously considered in a context of perpetual 
ﬁ  nancial innovation.5
These areas include:
• Better access by banks, on an initial and ongoing 
basis, to comprehensive information on their HLI 
counterparties, including information on their 
counterparties’ risk measures and management 
practices. This is important to accurately assess the 
overall risk proﬁ  le and the credit quality of their HLI 
counterparties. The industry is fortunately playing a 
very active role in this area. The CRMPG II report, 
notably, made some recommendations which are 
highly relevant to hedge funds’ risks, such as to seek 
more comprehensive data from counterparties and 
to periodically review the risk metrics, stress-test 
methodologies or behavioural characteristics of the 
models used by these counterparties. However, the 
implementation of these recommendations, although 
spurred by supervisory encouragements, is still a 
challenging issue. Indeed, they may sometime be 
seen by ﬁ  nancial institutions as unrealistic, notably 
given the costs associated with frequent reviews of 
counterparty risk management practices. Moreover, 
they might be difﬁ  cult to make acceptable to the 
HLI themselves, which often compete with banks 
proprietary desks. In practice, many counterparties, 
and HLI in particular, offer their banks only limited 
transparency regarding their overall risk proﬁ  le, and 
even less regarding their risk metrics and stress tests. 
Limits to such transparency are well understood. 
But the cursor currently needs to move toward more 
transparency. Supervisors, worldwide, have begun 
and should continue, in a coordinated effort, to make 
it move towards a level, which still fully allows HLI to 
efﬁ  ciently exploit trading opportunities, while, at the 
same time, enabling sound risk management within 
the banks which ﬁ  nance and trade with them.
• More incorporation of counterparty transparency 
and credit quality into collateral decisions and margin 
policies. Closely-linking collateral arrangements 
to an assessment of counterparties credit quality 
was an important area, highlighted by the Basel 
Committee in its sound practices paper, where 
practices at many banks still need to be enhanced. 
Collateral is to be set at a threshold that varies 
depending on the counterparty credit worthiness, 
but should be sustainable over time and cope with 
market gaps. Although it appears quite common for 
banks to use more stringent collateral requirements 
with derivatives trading counterparties and HLI in 
particular, the amount and quality of collateralization 
is not always particularly focused on individual 
counterparty credit risk proﬁ  le, funding liquidity risk 
and leverage level. Margin policies should also, as 
mentioned in the CRMPG II report, take into account 
material differences in the transparency offered by 
the counterparties as well as in the various detailed 
provisions of the legal documentation. In case of 
several prime brokers, risks increase given the lower 
degree of transparency of the hedge fund toward 
each of its prime broker; hence the bar needs to be 
raised in term of the required risk mitigation. Finally, 
initial margins are important besides margin calls. 
Initial margin constitutes the buffer which enables 
to cope with price gaps, i.e. sudden large price 
changes, and those price gaps are much more likely 
to happen with hedge funds than with many other 
counterparties, since hedge fund often concentrate 
trading on complex and illiquid instruments.
• Effective improvements of exposures measurement, 
notably in the context of complex and illiquid 
products. Over the past years, banks have continued 
to make progress in strengthening their assessment 
of the potential future exposure (PFE) arising 
from their trading activities. In most cases, these 
improvements in methodologies covered exposures 
to the HLI sector as well as to other counterparties. 
Recognizing such a progress, the Basel Committee, 
under Basel  II, has given banks the possibility, 
provided they meet some operational requirements, 
4  Banks’ Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institutions (2000): “Implementation of the Basel Committee’s Sound Practices Paper”, BCBS, January.
5  A recent Deloitte research, “Precautions that pay off: risk management and valuation practices in the global hedge fund industry”, also illustrates this point.ARTICLES
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to adopt, for regulatory purposes, an internal model 
for estimating expected positive exposure (EPE) 
arising from their counterparty credit risk. However, 
it remains challenging to integrate new complex and 
structured products into such methodologies and 
such products, e.g. share of hedge funds, which are 
generally less liquid, have resulted in an escalation 
of certain types of risk (liquidity, concentration, 
correlation), which may not be fully captured by 
current models if they are not constantly upgraded. 
Model risk needs in this context to be speciﬁ  cally 
taken into account.
• Enhanced stress testing capabilities. Stress testing 
and scenario analysis have become central to the 
general process of risk management. Speciﬁ  c to the 
risk management of hedge fund related exposures is 
the importance of the tail risk, i.e. the risk of extreme 
but important losses. Stress testing methodologies 
as well as the reporting practices vary signiﬁ  cantly 
across institutions: in many instances, on site exams 
have shown that the operational effectiveness of 
such tools is still to be enhanced. From a general 
perspective, stress tests based on historic crisis are 
unlikely to be sufﬁ  cient in case of hedge funds, 
whose techniques are rapidly evolving. Speciﬁ  cally, 
correlation of tail risks is a particularly difﬁ  cult issue 
which requires due attention, given its importance 
for an assessment of systemic vulnerabilities.
In addition, on site exams have shown that very few, 
if any, banks’ stress testing capabilities incorporate 
the interactions between extreme market price 
movements and the degree of market liquidity
of their HLI exposures. More generally, they do 
not sufﬁ  ciently capture adequately the effects of a 
general loss of liquidity.
More progress on these areas would be helped by 
further enhancements to HLI general transparency 
to the market. Stress tests, indeed, should enable 
banks to capture their full exposure to a sufﬁ  ciently 
broad range of adverse conditions. But this is often 
not yet done in a totally convincing manner. Stress 
tests should include, not only their potential direct 
exposure to a particular hedge fund, but also their 
overall exposure to market dislocations, which might 
be associated with the failure of a major hedge 
fund or with a wave of medium sized hedge fund 
failures (second round effects). Such second round
effects are likely to increase the loss given default 
on the bankrupt hedge funds since collateral could 
be subject to large price gaps. In addition, they are 
likely to increase the correlation between losses 
on different market and credit exposures. In order 
to take account of these second round effects, 
information, not only on the speciﬁ  c hedge funds 
counterparties of a speciﬁ  c bank, but also broader 
market information, is required. Hence, the cursor 
needs to move towards more general market 
transparency of HLI. Such evolution has taken 
place for banks and this will continue to be the case
under Pillar  3 of the Basel  II framework which 
concentrates on the market discipline. For example, 
banks have made much more progress than HLI on 
VaR public disclosure and, notwithstanding the well 
known limitations of VaR ﬁ  gures, there is no reason 
why HLI could not communicate such ﬁ  gures to the 
market, or even more sophisticated ones. 
Clearly, the implementation of these 
recommendations is still work in progress and will 
be for some time. On the industry side, it is essential 
that senior managers of ﬁ  nancial  institutions 
systematically monitor the progress being made 
relative to these standards. For supervisors, it is 
critical to continue to examine in depth the risk 
management practices of banks that are major hedge 
funds counterparties, both on an on-going basis 
to gain precise insight and through discussions in 
international fora to coordinate responses to speciﬁ  c 
risk accumulation. This has, for example, recently 
led to successfully tackle the accumulation of credit 
derivatives backlogs which involved a lot of trades 
with hedge funds.
3| PROMOTING EFFICIENT OVERSIGHT
OF HEDGE FUNDS’ RELATIONS
WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS
A second line of defence against hedge funds 
related risks is an efﬁ  cient oversight of the trading 
relations they have with their counterparties, prime 
brokers and more generally banks, as well as the 
relationships they have with other institutions
or their customers. Such oversight may be carried out 
by the ofﬁ  cial sector, notably by banking supervisors. 
And in some instances, like the ﬁ  ght against money 
laundering through complex legal structures,
this role is essential. But, to some extent, the private 
sector itself can also play a role.ARTICLES
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It is critical for banking supervisors, in addition to 
the general recommendation they make, to examine 
the actual risk management practices of the banks 
that are major hedge funds counterparties. This 
is part of normal supervisory action. The sound 
practices of the Basel Committee have been in 
general incorporated into supervisory action.
On-site examinations of banks’ activities with hedge 
funds may be part of routine supervisory reviews
of counterparty risk management practices. But 
they may also be performed in the context of 
speciﬁ  c targeted reviews which aim at assessing 
in depth the practices of the major banks involved 
with hedge funds. Most supervisors, as in France, 
have indeed carried out over the past years speciﬁ  c
on-site examinations which seek to make sure of the 
adequacy of an institution’s internal organization in 
relation to the speciﬁ  c nature and the risks arising 
from its activities with hedge funds and to ensure 
that the accounting and ﬁ  nancial  information 
provided to supervisors is not only truthful but also 
meaningful. In particular, it is important to push 
for good practices in a business line to be applied 
in others while this is not to be taken as granted in 
all large and complex institutions. If not, corrective 
actions are requested.
In addition, it is important to note that the Basel 
Committee’s sound practices are, under the Basel II 
framework, part of the guidance related to Pillar 2, 
namely the supervisory review process which deals 
with all banking risks and not only those covered 
by the Pillar  1 regulatory capital charge. This 
will incorporate some of the risks speciﬁ  cities or 
speciﬁ  cally concentrated in hedge fund exposures, 
i.e. liquidity risk, concentration risks, tail risks, 
model risks... It will also focus, beyond the regulatory 
capital, on the economic capital that banks consider 
necessary for running their business in a sound and 
proﬁ  table manner over the long term, i.e. in order to 
absorb shocks such as those to which they are exposed 
via their, otherwise lucrative, business with hedge 
funds. This should undoubtedly contribute to make 
the regulatory oversight of banks exposures to hedge 
funds more proactive. And, through international 
discussion, in particular in the Basel Committee 
context, it should also make it internationally more 
coordinated. It should be noted, positively, that the 
economic capital assigned by many banks to their 
hedge fund related exposures is often much higher 
that the regulatory capital, in particular when such 
economic capital correctly takes into account sharp 
stress tests. However, less positively, all banks do not 
show the same cautiousness, in particular in taking 
into account liquidity gap stress tests. Obviously, 
as mentioned above, such stress tests are difﬁ  cult 
to put in place; they are complex to model and less 
information is available on hedge funds’ behaviour 
and market role than for other ﬁ  nancial or corporate 
entities. More international analysis on the required 
data and potential models useful to enhance risk 
management would therefore be welcome so that a 
common sound pressure can be made efﬁ  ciently on 
international banks.
It seems also currently critical to check that
banks’ internal information systems are capable 
of capturing the full range of exposures to 
individual counterparties, in particular hedge 
funds, and that supervisors can receive, when 
need be, such information. This should encompass 
general information regarding all the various 
activities of a bank with hedge funds (derivatives, 
secured ﬁ   nancing, prime brokerage…), in the 
form of quantitative data (exposures, including 
potential future credit exposures) but also more 
qualitative information (due diligence procedures,
stress-testing…). This is not easy since a bank may 
have a wide range of exposures to hedge funds, 
in direct or indirect ways. Indirect exposures are 
exposures to counterparties that have also exposures 
to hedge funds and to ﬁ  nancial markets affected 
by hedge funds. Direct exposures can arise from 
several types of transactions that can be divided into 
two main categories: transactions where banks act 
as counterparties to hedge funds, such as though 
unsecured lending, secured ﬁ  nancing,  prime 
brokerage and OTC derivatives, and transactions 
where banks act as investors in hedge funds, either 
in their proprietary trading and own account 
investment civilities or in order to offer to their 
customers traditional or structured products indexed 
to hedge funds return, often including some capital 
guarantee. These various exposures relate to various 
business areas within banks, with often different risk 
management and reporting systems. It is all the more 
crucial for senior risk ofﬁ  cers and management to 
have a comprehensive view of the risks that might 
seem properly diversiﬁ  ed in normal time but might 
be strongly correlated in time of stress.
From a micro-prudential perspective, this 
information will allow supervisors to check that 
banks have a real tool to avail of a comprehensive ARTICLES
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view on the risks related to all their activities 
with hedge funds. From a ﬁ  nancial  stability 
perspective, it will help them to assess the degree
of vulnerability of their banking system to the 
hedge funds’ sector. The ﬁ  nancial  industry, 
through the CRMPG II report, has also highlighted 
the need for enhanced transparency in this respect, 
mentioning notably that “ﬁ  nancial intermediaries 
should provide their primary supervisors with 
timely quantitative and qualitative risk-related 
information on a regular basis and be prepared 
to provide such information on an ad hoc basis 
when circumstances warrant”.
In addition to the efforts made by the ofﬁ  cial sector, 
third parties, like hedge fund professional associations 
and rating agencies, can also play an active role in 
support of an indirect supervision. Professional 
associations can promote the implementation
of codes of good conducts. In addition, rating 
agencies have already given ratings to various 
funds, mutual funds but also already to a few hedge 
funds. However, up to now, they had mixed result 
in attracting such hedge funds customers. They are 
now developing their methodologies in order to 
play a more active role and develop this business.
This is welcome since rating agencies role could 
contribute to make code of good standards, sponsored 
by the industry, more widely accepted and lead 
them to more clearly take into account hedge funds 
counterparties’ and investors’ interests. It could 
also increase transparency, since rating agencies, 
working on a multilateral basis, would be able to 
compare all hedge funds they rate and could publish 
part of their ﬁ  ndings, contrary to banks which 
have more bilateral relations with hedge funds
and, obviously, do not publish the assessment
of their counterparties. 
One should however not assume that an increased 
role of rating agencies will make hedge funds risk 
very different from what it is today. The role of rating 
agencies is softer than the indirect supervision, 
since rating agencies have only an impact through 
their inﬂ  uence on market discipline, which is not 
always responding as expected. The information 
given to the public, markets or regulators, beyond 
the ratings, might also be scarce and not really 
oriented towards an assessment of systemic 
vulnerabilities. In addition, rating agencies are 
themselves sometimes criticized for shortcomings, 
e.g. for not being enough forward-looking,
which is a speciﬁ  c problem regarding hedge funds 
whose strategies ﬂ  uctuate a lot.
Finally, although rating agencies have made attempt 
to described their current or planed methodologies, 
it is still too early to say which exact type of rating 
would become the market standard vis-à-vis hedge 
funds. This is however likely to be a key element
of the success, or not, of the rating agencies. Further 
analyses in international fora between regulators 
and the industry might be warranted in that respect 
For example should hedge funds ratings concentrate 
on appropriate risk management and transparency 
procedures, so that these two aspects can be relied 
upon, while leaving aside the assessment of the 
exact hedge funds’ market and credit risks since this 
changes very quickly, and investors and banking 
counterparties need to put in place their own risk 
assessment as promoted by the Basel II framework? 
All in all, an increased role of rating agencies
vis-à-vis hedge funds would probably be beneﬁ  cial: 
it allows moving the lines into the right direction, 
on the controversial debate between market friendly 
benign neglect and active public interventions prone 
views. However, it can only be one avenue along 
with the already mentioned indirect supervision 
through the banking system.
A “market-led” transparency, i.e. through the 
increased transparency and the due diligence 
carried out by institutional investors and funds
of hedge funds would also play in the same direction 
but with relatively similar limits unless it is not 
supported internationally by the public sector.
In particular it is important to improve the quality 
of hedge fund shares’ valuation and of the current 
private data base on hedge funds. Such data bases 
usefulness is notably to contribute to the general 
understanding of characteristics of the hedge fund 
sector which are necessary to expand stress tests. 
A factor analysis of a simple series of returns can 
indeed already give interesting insight. However 
such data bases currently suffer from numerous well 
known bias and even shortcomings due, in particular 
to the voluntary nature of the information given by 
hedge funds which are not signiﬁ  cantly checked. 
Funds of hedge funds and institutional investors 
could increase market discipline in this regards.
Finally, one should note that rating agencies, funds 
of hedge funds when they are sold to retail investors, 
and hedge funds themselves when they get direct ARTICLES
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ﬁ  nancing through the issuance of bonds or want 
to carry out an IPO on an organised exchange, 
are under the jurisdiction of securities regulators, 
like the AMF in France, with their international 
coordination fora, such as IOSCO. The supervision 
by IOSCO members of some of the hedge funds 
external relationships with non banks, allows a 
convergence of banking and securities supervision 
which certainly fosters a more efﬁ  cient management 
of hedge funds related risks. True, there might be 
some aspects of hedge funds activities which are 
not under the oversight of any regulators, and 
hence where market discipline is not helped by 
public support, e.g. bilateral trades between two 
hedge funds, but this seems to be rare, at least for 
the time being. The cooperation between banking
and securities supervisors should continue to allow 
indirect supervision to be strengthened when need 
be and updated accordingly with the changing 
characteristics of the hedge fund business.
4| IMPLEMENTING
ADEQUATE CAPITAL RULES
Banks are required by supervisors to hold regulatory 
capital, as a buffer in relation to the risks they take 
on. Capital adequacy requirements indeed form 
the third line of defence against the risks that a 
ﬁ  nancial institution assumes today when dealing 
with hedge funds.
For regulatory purposes, banks classify their direct 
exposures to hedge funds either in the banking book 
or in the trading book. These exposures are subject 
to the corresponding capital treatment (through the 
computations of credit risk exposures in the banking 
book as well as credit and market risk exposures in 
the trading book).
Neither the 1988 Basel Capital Accord (Basel  I) 
nor the 1996 Market Risk Amendment (MRA) 
were well suited to deal with exposures to hedge 
funds. Basel I did not provide much differentiation
of capital requirements in terms of credit risk levels 
and resulted in the application of a maximum risk 
weight of 100  %. But exposures to hedge funds 
can be signiﬁ   cantly more risky than those to 
corporate, notably in view of their leverage and the 
shortage of information about these counterparties. 
Hence, the 100 % risk weightings for hedge funds 
counterparties has appeared inadequate overtime. 
Furthermore, the MRA, although allowing the 
use of internal models for regulatory purpose, 
presented difﬁ  culties in capturing risks associated 
with exposures that are beyond the assumptions
of Value-at-Risk (e.g. 99% conﬁ  dence  interval,
and 10-business-day holding period). In particular, 
as shown by on-site exams, the assumption that 
positions can be closed out or hedged within 
ten days may prove inappropriate for many hedge 
funds exposures. For instance, equity stakes in 
hedge funds or in funds of funds, held for hedging 
structured products that are supplied to investors, 
are generally recorded by banks in the trading book 
even though the liquidity of these equity stakes is 
limited, notably given the low frequency at which 
the issuing funds may redeem them (usually on 
a monthly or quarterly basis and sometimes on a 
half-yearly basis). The inclusion of such illiquid 
hedge funds equity stakes in the trading book has 
therefore generally resulted in insufﬁ  cient capital 
requirements: they only marginally contribute to 
the VaR on the institutions’ overall trading portfolio 
although presenting considerable risks.
Although Basel II does not provide for a speciﬁ  c 
treatment of exposures to hedge funds, it is 
much better suited to deal with the risks that
hedge funds may pose. First, as far as the banking 
book is concerned, the spectrum of risk weights in 
Basel II is much broader than in the 1988 Accord 
and will appropriately result, notably in the Internal 
Ratings-Based Approach, in the application of risk 
weights of over 100% to exposures on counterparties 
with a high probability of default. Second, the BCBS 
and IOSCO proposals of July 2005, the so-called Basel 
2.5 which is included in the comprehensive version 
of the Basel II framework, will improve the trading 
book regulatory regime, including for hedge funds 
exposures. Indeed, these measures aim at clarifying 
the types of exposures that qualify for inclusion in 
the trading book and provide further guidance on 
prudent valuation methods and stress tests of these 
exposures. Banks will especially have to implement 
a clear set of policies and procedures for determining 
which positions could be included in, and which 
should be excluded from, the trading book. In this 
respect, the Basel Committee is of the view that open 
equity stakes in hedge funds should be booked in the 
banking book, owing to the signiﬁ  cant constraints on 
the ability of banks to liquidate these positions and ARTICLES
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It is key for supervisors to ﬁ  nd the right interactions between market discipline and indirect supervision. 
Essential for an effective indirect supervision is a combination of several elements which are mutually 
reinforcing and which contribute together to enhance the resilience of the ﬁ  nancial system to shocks: strong 
internal controls within ﬁ  nancial institutions that are major hedge funds counterparties (risk management), 
efﬁ  cient external controls of these institutions (oversight) and adequate capital buffer against the risks they 
take on the HLI sector (capital adequacy).
As already mentioned, this will always be work in progress and international cooperation between banking 
supervisors as well as with other supervisors is needed to get regulatory and supervisory practices converging 
in front of new challenge. It is the appropriate way forward to get effective results in the context of the, 
otherwise positive, but sometime too short term oriented, competitive pressures in the ﬁ  nancial sector.
Furthermore, indirect supervision needs to be leveraged by several forms of transparency in order to yield 
more market discipline: ﬁ  nancial institutions should get sufﬁ  ciently broad information from hedge funds, 
both directly and indirectly, so as to be able to manage their risks efﬁ  ciently. In practice, hedge funds still 
offer their banking counterparties often only limited transparency. The redeﬁ  nition of the quantity and 
quality of the information they exchange remains a challenge. The same is true for hedge funds general 
transparency to the market. Full transparency is neither realistic nor welcome when it impacts negatively 
market efﬁ  ciency. But more transparency is needed to ensure ﬁ  nancial stability and integrity. The industry 
needs to move in that direction to continue to grow.
Last but not least, let me note that micro prudential and macro prudential targets could and should converge. 
On the one hand, stress tests enhance individual institutions’ risk management. On the other hand, stress 
tests need to take into account second round effects, i.e. systemic risk, even if the cost of carrying out 
such sophisticated stress tests may sometime seem high, at least at ﬁ  rst sight, to the banking industry.
For the macro prudential approach, it is a very important step: when banking supervisors, in their traditional 
micro prudential approach, press for more comprehensive stress tests by each individual institution,
they want to force banks to take into account the cost they will bear in the occurrence of systemic risk.
It is an important and efﬁ  cient way to comfort ﬁ  nancial stability.
value them reliably on a daily basis. It is important 
that such guidance be implemented in a strict and 
consistent manner at an international level.
These measures will result in an appropriate increase 
in the level of capital charges associated with trading 
book positions that are less liquid or present a high 
default risk, such as some hedge funds exposures. In 
particular, banks will be required to hold regulatory 
capital to protect against such risk in the form of an 
incremental default risk charge. These measures 
will promote the convergence of the level of capital 
required between the banking book and the trading 
book and then reduce the possibilities of regulatory 
arbitrage. Furthermore, the additional Pillar  2 
measures under Basel 2.5 will require banks to 
demonstrate that they hold enough internal capital 
to cover adequately the risks associated with these 
hedge fund exposures, taking into account the output 
of internal valuation adjustments and stress testing.